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CO-OPTING THE CLASS ACTION
John Leubsdorft
When the Georgine court denied leave to thirty-seven teachers of
Professional Responsibility to file an amicus brief opposing designa-
tion of proposed class counsel,1 its opinion observed that "(with all
due respect) the moving law teachers have only limited knowledge of
the underlying facts and issues before the Court."2 As the main au-
thor of that brief, I must be the only participant in this conference
whose ignorance of the case around which it centers has been judi-
cially certified. For that reason, and because I generally agree with
what she says, I will not comment on Susan Koniak's cogent criticism
of Georgine.3 Nor will I try to answer most of Carrie Menkel-Meadow's
thoughtful questions,4 except to express the belief (which she would
surely join) that the number and difficulty of those questions will not
excuse us from taking positions on the issues that mass torts raise.
I
My starting point is a single one of Professor Menkel-Meadow's
questions: "Has anyone else noted the irony that many of the critics
of mass tort class action settlements were often proponents of class
actions in other contexts-civil rights, consumer fraud, etc.?" 5 As
such a critic and proponent, I have an explanation and justification to
propose for myself and others.
t Professor, Rutgers Law School-Newark. The author was the main author of a Brief
of Law Teachers as Amici Curiae sought to be filed in opposition to the designation of
proposed class counsel in Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa.
1994), and has since been retained as an expert by persons opposing the proposed settle-
ment in Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., No. 93-526 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 1993). The author has
also served as class counsel in school desegregation and prison reform cases., Many thanks
to Kathleen A. Sullivan for her help.
1 Brief of Law Teachers as Amici Curiae, Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157
F.,.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (No. 9-0215) (submitted Apr. 1, 1994).
2 Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., No. 93-0215 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 8, 1994) (order deny-
ing leave to file amicus brief).
3 Susan Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Anchem Prods., Inc., 80 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 1045 (1995).
4 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules
Meet the Road, 80 CoRNm.r L. REv. 1159 (1995).
5 Id. at 1219 n.229.
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We see in Georgine and some of its progeny6 a possible future in
which, once again, the "haves" will come out ahead.7 We are afraid
that the class action will be co-opted-that an institution that lawyers
and scholars have shaped to assist the relatively powerless will be
turned against the powerless by the powerful. We fear that what was
meant to provide a remedy for those who would otherwise lack one,
enabling them to pool their voices and finances, 8 will become a device
to take away remedies from those who could otherwise invoke them.
Whatever judgment courts and commentators will ultimately
render on Georgine, that case poses in stark terms the possibility of
such an upset. When those who have brought separate tort suits do
better than comparable class members, when hundreds of thousands
of possible claimants seek to opt out of the class action during the
twelve weeks available, one naturally asks who is benefiting from the
action and at whose expense. Defenders of Georgine may claim that
those who benefit are potential claimants who might recover nothing
were asbestos claims to drive these defendants out of business. So far
as I can tell, these defendants are in no immediate danger of bank-
ruptcy, and the real beneficiaries of the settlement are defendants
that reduce their liabilities, courts that reduce their backlogs, and law-
yers who increase their fees. In any event, even the possibility that
class actions are being used to reduce and extinguish claims is enough
to make those of us who value class actions for other reasons worry
that our baby is being taken from us.
II
In retrospect, one can see that criticism of the potential misuse of
the class action has gone through three stages of development. These
stages grow out of the traditional debate about whether and when
class members can properly be bound by a litigation to which they are
not parties.9 My separation in this discussion of these three develop-
mental stages is somewhat artificial; they are intertwined, both themat-
6 See the cases described in John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass
Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REv. (forthcoming 1995). For a summary of Coffee's argu-
ment, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Summary, The Corruption of the Class Action: The New Technol-
ogy of Collusion, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 851 (1995). Of course, I am not suggesting that all tort
class actions are undesirable-on the contrary-or that they should never be settled.
7 Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change 9 LAw & Soc'y REv. 95 (1974).
8 Obviously, this is not the only function that class actions have served. See, e.g., FLtrM-
INGJAMFS, JR. Er AL., CIIL PROCEDURE § 10.20 (4th ed. 1992) (stating that class actions, in
addition to permitting the pooling of resources, provide a mechanism for enforcing the
laws, joining or protecting the interests of all necessary parties, and permitting suits by
entities not otherwise recognizable as legal entities).
9 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FROM MEDIEVAL GROUP LITIGATION TO THE MODERN CLASS
AcrION 213-37 (1987) (discussing group litigation in the United States before 1950).
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ically and temporally. All three stages represent the views of scholars
with much sympathy for the potential of class actions to provide col-
lective remedies, as opposed to the extremist view of those who have
spoken of the class action as a Frankenstein's monster preying upon
defendants.' 0
Derrick Bell's critique of school desegregation lawyers exempli-
fies the first stage of concern about class actions." His critique was
part of a broader questioning of public interest lawyers, 12 which in
turn was part of the 1970s critique of the 1960s. Professor Bell feared
that desegregation lawyers, taking advantage of the relative freedom
from client control that class actions afford, would neglect client inter-
ests to pursue their own ideals or those of the national civil rights
organizations with which they were associated. It awakens some nos-
talgia to look back to a time when the prime worry of scholars was that
zeal for their own visions of the public interest would lead lawyers
astray. Nevertheless, this recognition that the interests of lawyers
could diverge from those of the represented class focused our atten-
tion on the need for scrupulous investigation of class action lawyers.
A second stage of concern developed during the 1980s. Com-
mentators such as John Coffee argued that class-action and derivative-
suit lawyers were seeking fees regardless of their clients' interests. Cof-
fee argued, for example, that such lawyers were settling class actions
without real benefit to the class.' 3 Once again, this argument was part
of a broader view-in this instance, one of lawyers as economic ac-
tors' 4 -that itself reflected a trend in the decade's thought. Greed
10 See, e.g., Arthur Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining Knights: Myth, Reality,
and the "Class Action Problem", 92 HARv. L. REv. 664 (1979) (describing but rejecting this
view).
11 Derrick Bell, Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in SchoolDesegre-
gation Litigation, 85 YALE LJ. 470 (1976).
12 See, e.g., Kenney Hegand, Beyond Enthusiasm and Commitmen 13 Aniz. L. REv. 805
(1971) (discussing whether the public interest firm is capable of assuming adequate repre-
sentation of underrepresented interests and people); Gary Bellow & Jeanne Kettleson,
From Ethics to Politics: Confronting Scarcity and Fairness in Public Interest Practice, 58 B.U. L. Ray.
337 (1978) (discussing ethical dilemmas in public interest practice).
'3 E.g.,John C. Coffee,Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness
and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1987) (building on Professor
Coffee's earlier work). See also, e.g., In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 98 F.R.D. 48 (E.D. Pa.
1983), affd in part and rev'd in part, 751 F.2d 562 (3d Cir. 1984);Jonathan Macey & Geof-
frey Miller, The Plaintiffs'Attorney's Role in Class Actions and Derivative Suits: Economic Analysis
and Recommendations forReform, 58 U. CHL L. REy. 1 (1991) (discussing the entrepreneurial
attorney and proposing revision in the regulatory system).
14 See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont &John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REv. 529 (1978) (discussing the contingency and hourly fee systems and pro-
posing a third alternative); John Leubsdorf, The Contingency Factor in Attorney Fee Awards, 90
YALE LJ. 473 (1981) (discussing the application of a contingency multiplier to attorney
fees); RonaldJ. Gilson & Robert Mnookin, Coming of Age in a Corporate Law Firm: The Eco-
nomics of Associate Career Patterns, 41 STA'. L. REv. 567 (1989) (discussing the "up-or-out"
career path among lawyers); see also Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975)
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was recognized and practiced before the 1980s, even among lawyers.
But this economic viewpoint has unfortunately tended to foster the
behavior it purports to describe by treating greed as normal and
inescapable.'
5
This symposium exemplifies the third stage of concern, which
moves beyond a focus on the temptations of class counsel to an analLy-
sis of how those opposing the class-that is, defendants and their law-
yers-can manipulate those temptations for their own benefit. We
scholars now know that class actions can benefit the party opposing
the class, by shielding it from further litigation, 16 and that settlement
negotiations can put class counsel under pressure to let their clients
down for the sake of their fees.' 7 Of course defense counsel know this
too. Some defense counsel may feel obligated to put that knowledge
to work to persuade class members to settle for less. Some courts will
accept the resulting behavior of defense and class counsel as a reason-
able response to real incentives. Everyone benefits, except the class
members. In any event, none of the participants had a choice, did
they? One hopes that such a system of actors whose interacting temp-
tations draw them like an invisible hand to a bad result will not some
day be recalled as typifying the world of the 1990s.
III
That class actions can be turned around in this way should cause
little surprise. Powerful persons usually have good lawyers. And pro-
cedural law usually has an ambiguous and changing impact. When
reformers established small claims courts to assist poor claimants,
other reformers arrived some decades later to find collection agencies
using those courts against the poor.'8 When legislators and judges
established long-arm statutes so that local plaintiffs could stay at home
when suing multistate defendants, some multistate plaintiffs were able
to use those statutes to drag local defendants into distant courts. 19
(holding that attorney fee schedule and its enforcement mechanism constitute price-fixing
and are subject to the Sherman Act).
15 SeeJOYCE APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THourHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
ENGLAND (1978).
16 See Kenneth Dam, Class Action Notice: Who Needs It?, 1974 Sup. Or. REv. 97, 120.
17 See, e.g., Charles Wolfram, The Second Set of Payers Lauyers, Fee-Shifting and the Limits
of ProfesionalDiscipline, 47 LAw & CorTmp. PROBS. 293 (1984); see also Prandini v. National
Tea Co., 557 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir. 1977), overruled by Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717 (1986)
(instituting a ban on simultaneous negotiations of merits and attorney-fee issues to prevent
attorneys from trading relief benefitting the class for a more generous fee).
18 Eric H. Steele, The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts, 1981 A.B. FoUND. REs.J.
295, 342; Barbara Yngvesson & Patricia Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review
of the Small Claims Literature, 9 LAW & Soc'y Rrv. 219 (1975).
19 E.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
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Procedural mutability sometimes helps the less powerful. The la-
bor injunction, dispatched in the federal courts pursuant to the Nor-
ris-La Guardia Act,20 was revived in a better form as the civil rights
injunction.21 Edward Purcell describes the downfall, as well as the
rise, of defendants' use of removal to federal court to place obstacles
in the way of the victims of industrial accidents.
22
The justification and impact of class actions have varied over the
years, as did those of other procedural institutions. Certainly, the
class action did not arise to help the relatively powerless, who figure in
some of the earlier precedents as members of defendant classes. 23 If
any single theme pervades the development of the class action, as Ste-
phen Yeazell memorably describes it, it is not the protection of the
weak but the use of the class action to permit suit by and against
groups that did not qualify as legal entities.24
Indeed, as late as 1940 the class action appeared in Hansbeny v.
Lee25 as, if anything, a menace to the class members. In that case, the
Illinois courts took an adjudication upholding the validity of a racially
restrictive covenant and, based on inaccurate factual stipulations,
turned it retroactively into a class action judgment.26 Had the
Supreme Court not read the Due Process Clause to prohibit this re-
sult, opponents of the covenant would have been bound by the result
of a proceeding in which no one represented their interests. At the
time, it would have been hard to predict that civil rights litigators and
others would soon reshape the class action.
The modern analysis of the class action dates only from Harry
Kalven and Maurice Rosenfield's article published in 1941,27 which
argued that class actions could provide mass remedies and deter un-
lawful behavior. Even then, the subsequent transmutation of the class
action proceeded under a cloud of rhetoric, much of which spoke of
judicial efficiency-a goal that class actions have rarely forwarded, at
least until very recently.28
20 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-110, 113-115 (1988).
21 See OwEN M. Fiss, THE CIVIL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); Ow N M. Fiss & DOUc
RENDLE MAN, INJUNCTIONS (2d ed. 1984); FELIX FRmKFURTER & NATHAN GREEN, THE LABOR
INJUNCTION (1930).
22 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LrriGATiON AND INEQUALITY (1992).
23 Yeazell, supra note 9, at 135.
24 Id. at 160-228.
25 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
26 Hansbeny was decided before Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), held racially
restrictive covenants unenforceable.
27 Harry Kalven, Jr. &Maurice Rosenfield, The Contempora7y Function of the Class Suit, 8
U. Cn. L. REv. 684 (1941).
28 See Edward Sherman, Class Actions and Duplicative Litigation, 62 IND. LJ. 507 (1986)
(discussing how efficiency might be furthered).
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The class action, in short, has always been up for grabs. Whether
it helps the powerless or the powerful, whether it makes remedies
available or extinguishes them, will depend on the choices that law-
yers, scholars, judges, and legislators make. Those of us who see the
class action as a tool for equal justice under law will have to struggle to
implement that vision.
